

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN

(United Arab Republic)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE.

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. J. TEHOV

Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON

U SEIN BWA

U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. S. F. RAE

Mr. J. F. M. BELL

Mr. A. E. GOTLIEB

Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. BUCEK

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE

Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R. K. NEHRU

Mr. A. S. MEHTA

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G. P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mrs. H. CHLOND

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. N. ECOBESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. P. LIND
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C. G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A. A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I. G. USACHEV
Mr. V. V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A. F. HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S. E. IBRAHIM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J. G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. A. J. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. W. C. FOSTER
Mr. A. L. RICHARDS
Mr. D. S. MacDONALD
Mr. R. A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General;

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I declare open the one-hundred and sixty-eighth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): Mr. Chairman, let me begin by saying how glad we are to have you in our midst once again.

During the month which has passed since this session of our Conference began, we have heard something about what has been achieved so far through disarmament negotiations and, quite rightly, much more about what has yet to be achieved. Among the former are the partial nuclear test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the agreement not to place nuclear weapons in orbit (A/RES/1884(XVIII), ENDC/117). As the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, said of the test ban treaty on 31 January, "that treaty imposes severe limits upon the testing and, as a result, the development of larger nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.162, p.16). It is perhaps not putting it too strongly to say that that Treaty severely limits the possibility of the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons. Similarly, the agreement not to place nuclear weapons in orbit limits the possibility that the arms race might be extended to outer space.

Thus both those measures prevent the arms race from reaching newer and unimagined heights which would probably prove to be beyond the reach and control of man. In that sense they represent achievements whose importance should not be minimized. However, those agreements do nothing whatsoever to prevent the present generation of nuclear weapons from multiplying and growing in destructiveness even as we sit here talking about disarmament. They do not ensure that these nuclear weapons do not get into new hands or into new areas where they do not now exist. They do not halt the armaments race, and they do nothing to rid the world of the already intolerable burden of armaments, or even to reduce the load.

This is an extremely serious situation. It is serious because it confronts us with the danger that even the present generation of nuclear weapons, even if confined to the earth, could also get beyond man's reach and control. For that to happen, we do not need to develop new generations of nuclear weapons; we do not need to seek new environments. To emphasize that point I need make only a few references to some of the statements that have been made here recently.

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

Permit me to quote again from Mr. Foster's speech of 31 January. He said:

"For many years -- even while this Conference has been in session -- both sides have increased the numbers of their strategic nuclear vehicles to a substantial extent. In so doing, both have simply added to the amounts of their materials of war which must be destroyed if disarmament is to be achieved. To achieve it, we must stop the increases above present levels, increases which seem inevitable in the absence of agreement." (ENDC/PV.162, p.17)

Mr. Foster did not go into figures, but from other sources we obtain some idea of what the figures are as far as the United States is concerned. Speaking only of long-range ballistic missiles, the representative of Canada on 18 February quoted the United States Secretary of Defense as saying that the United States today had about 500 of those missiles and that by 1966 it would have more than 1,700 (ENDC/PV.167, p. 6).

We have no comparable figures for the Soviet Union, but we must assume that they also must be considerable and that the rate of increase, in the absence of an agreement to reduce or limit them, will also be comparable.

I ask you to think what that means. We know that both nuclear sides already have what has come to be termed "over-kill capacity", or, if the Russian version is preferred -- and for that version we are indebted to Mr. Tsarapkin -- "multiple destruction capacity" (ibid., p. 33). If that is so today, does it make any sense at all that both sides should continue to build up their "over-kill" capacity so that it approximately doubles itself every year?

Quite apart from the terrible menace which such a growing arsenal itself represents, every such increase makes the achievement of disarmament more difficult. The more one has of these terribly expensive weapons, the more difficult it is to agree to destroy them. The more one has of such armaments, the more difficult it is to keep some of them from reaching other hands. The more hands they reach, the more difficult does it become to reach an agreement to disarm. So the vicious circle will go on until, as I have said, disarmament will become an unattainable dream, even without a return to nuclear tests in the three environments from which they are now banned, and even if outer space remains free of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

What then should we do? The obvious and most desirable solution is, of course, that we should sign a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control. We must therefore press our negotiations to that end. Even if we have not exactly been encouraged by what we have heard so far, nevertheless we must persevere. But, while so persevering, we cannot permit time to continue to work against us. We must do what we can to prevent the situation from getting progressively worse and possibly placing disarmament beyond our reach and control.

It is here that collateral measures, or initial measures, can play an essential and vital role. If both sides were really serious about disarmament, the mere fact that they already possess "over-kill" capacity, or "multiple destruction capacity", would seem to my delegation to enable them to embark on a number of agreed initial measures without prejudicially affecting their security. For instance, we see no reason why the budgets of the main armed Powers should not be reduced by 10 to 15 per cent as proposed by the Soviet Union (ENDC/123, p.3). Apart from the salutary effect on the general armaments picture, such an agreement -- which would of course be subject to appropriate verification -- would serve as an example and an earnest to the world that the Powers concerned really meant business with regard to disarmament. As long as they continue to maintain their military expenditures at anywhere near their present levels, the world will understandably find it difficult to accept their **statements at face value**. Therefore we urge the Powers concerned to give this matter their most earnest attention.

Again, there seems to be no reason why the armaments race should be continued at all. In particular it seems ridiculous that the production of armaments, in which must be included the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, should be continuing when the total volume of the armaments existing is already sufficient to wipe out life on this planet many times over.

In his intervention on 30 January Mr. Ismail, the then leader of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, said:

"To halt the arms race is probably a most important prelude to disarmament. Perhaps the simplest way to achieve that result would be to make a verified halt of the development and production of armaments and to shut down the plants. Nuclear weapons and their vehicles of delivery should take first priority in this respect." (ENDC/PV.161, p.13)

(Mr. Barrington, Burma)

It is difficult not to agree with that conclusion. If the closing down of all armament plants in one step is likely to prove difficult -- and we can, of course, see why that might be so -- the plants producing the more sensitive weapons might well be closed down first, under appropriate international supervision.

In this context my delegation has already said (ibid., p.8) that it regards as being worthy of consideration President Johnson's proposal that

"The United States, the Soviet Union and their respective Allies should agree to explore a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles" (ENDC/120)

We are aware that the Soviet Union has expressed (ENDC/PV.167, p. 33) some reservations with regard to this proposal as presently formulated. However, my delegation is confident that the approach of the United States towards this matter is not inflexible. We are so convinced of the imperative necessity for bringing the arms race to a halt that we must express the hope that an exploration to this end will materialize before long and that it will result in an agreement satisfactory to both sides in the near future.

Reducing at source the funds available for military expenditures, and halting at least the more virulent part of the arms race, constitute in our view a realistic approach to the immediate situation which confronts us. In the same context there are also other steps we should consider, such as an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the beginning of the physical destruction of armaments. Agreements in those areas or, for that matter, on some of them would not only be valuable in themselves; the new atmosphere they would produce might well prove to be the key that would unlock the door to a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

If in this brief statement I have dealt only with some initial measures, it is not that we attach no importance to the other measures listed in President Johnson's message of 21 January (ENDC/120) and the Soviet Union's memorandum of 28 January (ENDC/123). In fact, I have said before (ENDC/PV.161, p.8) that my delegation would be prepared to discuss any of those measures in the belief that agreement on any of them would help to further the cause of disarmament in one way or other. Those particular measures were selected because they seemed to fit more precisely and immediately the aspect of the problem with which we were dealing today. We recognize the importance of all the other measures and expect to go into them in their proper context at the appropriate time.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): First of all, Mr. Chairman, I should like to welcome you on behalf of my delegation as you resume your place among us.

The Romanian delegation wishes to state briefly its attitude towards some of the collateral problems with which our Committee is dealing. In examining these problems, the Romanian delegation sets out from the conviction that any collateral measure should be closely linked to our main task, that of general and complete disarmament. Any measure which does not meet this requirement can only move us away from our principal objective, which was clearly defined in the decision adopted by our Committee on 23 March 1962 as

"the consideration ... of measures aimed at: the lessening of international tension; the consolidation of confidence among States; and facilitating general and complete disarmament" (ENDC/12).

We consider that the very notion of "collateral measures" implies the existence of a principal measure, which in this case is general and complete disarmament.

The importance that the Government of the Romanian People's Republic attaches to collateral measures, which are closely linked to the achievement of general and complete disarmament, was expressed once more in the Romanian Government's reply to the message addressed by Mr. Khrushchev to Heads of States and Governments.

In this reply Mr. Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, President of the Council of State of the Romanian People's Republic, said:

"The really radical solution which will make it possible to eliminate the danger of a world conflagration is general and complete disarmament, and its achievement calls for untiring and unremitting effort by all peace-loving States and peoples.

"At the same time, without slackening for a single instant the endeavour to attain this principal goal, it is possible and necessary to adopt measures directed towards easing tension and likely to strengthen confidence among States, to remove the danger of military conflicts, and to eliminate disputes or sources of tension. The Romanian Government has always acted and is still acting in this

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

spirit by contributing to the establishment of the principles of peaceful co-existence in relations between States with different social and political systems, and by giving its support to all initiatives designed for the strengthening of peace."

The Romanian Government's reply goes on:

"Like the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, the Romanian People's Republic considers that, in the present political situation, any measure designed to ease tension and strengthen confidence and co-operation among States is important and necessary. In this connexion, we consider that it is the duty of all States to take advantage of the ever-increasing opportunities that are now being created for the constructive examination of outstanding international problems.

"In the Romanian Government's opinion, it is essential to continue and intensify efforts to put an end to all tests of nuclear weapons, including underground tests, in order to promote the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the production of these weapons and vehicles for their delivery, and the destruction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons with a view to achieving the reduction, and ultimately the complete abolition, of all military forces and armaments.

"We are in favour of the adoption of concrete and effective measures for eliminating the danger of a surprise attack. We likewise support the conclusion of an agreement for the withdrawal of foreign troops stationed in the territory of other countries, because the adoption of this measure would also promote a return to the normal conditions of international life.

"The Romanian People's Republic continues to declare itself in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, because it regards this as a transitional measure which would lead to the abolition of the pernicious division of the world into military blocs."

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The fact that a number of proposals on collateral measures have been submitted during this session is undoubtedly to be welcomed.

I should like first of all to stress the importance of the proposals contained in the memorandum submitted by the Government of the Soviet Union on 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123). Our Committee also has before it a message from Mr. Johnson, President of the United States, dated 21 January (ENDC/120) of which the United States representative has given us a series of explanations; and the working paper on the reduction of military budgets submitted by the delegation of Brazil on 13 February 1964 (ENDC/126).

In order to be able to achieve the practical results which all the world is awaiting, it is essential to draw up a definite agenda by common agreement. We note, however, that no such agreement yet exists, and we venture to express the hope that it will be reached as soon as possible.

Since for the time being there is no agreement on the order of discussion of collateral measures, my delegation would like to refer to a few of these measures only.

The first measure about which I should like to speak today is the reduction of military budgets.

My delegation sees a good omen in the justified interest aroused in our Committee by the proposals for the reduction of military budgets, and in the fact that the method of "mutual good example" has begun to be applied. This method has been adopted by the two great Powers in connexion with the reduction of military appropriations for this year.

The fact that the Soviet Union has already carried out a reduction of 600 million roubles in its military budget for this year (ENDC/PV.157, pp. 13,14), and that the United States has announced its intention to reduce its expenditure by \$1,000 million, is certainly important.

At the same time we observe that this example has been followed by other States. We took note of the statement of Mr. Simovic, the representative of Czechoslovakia, that his country had reduced its military appropriations by 3.4 per cent as compared with its expenditure in 1963 (ENDC/PV.164, p.28).

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

So far as the Romanian People's Republic is concerned, I should like to inform the Committee that the proportion of its military expenditure in the overall budget has been reduced from 5.1 per cent in 1963 to 4.5 per cent in 1964.

The possibilities of the method of "mutual good example" have certainly not been exhausted in respect of the reduction of military budgets. It is to be expected that other States will follow this good example. At the same time, however, we cannot ignore the fact that the States Members of NATO are not all following the method of "mutual example". On the contrary, as has already been pointed out, certain States such as the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany are increasing their military appropriations for 1964. Thus a paradoxical situation seems to have arisen in which the good example is being followed by the other side rather than by the allies.

But it is obvious, as has already been said here, that a method of "mutual example" cannot by itself ensure a substantial reduction in military budgets. Hence my delegation associates itself with the view that an agreement should be concluded on this matter. I should like to stress that the two measures are by no means mutually exclusive, but on the contrary seem to be complementary. It cannot be denied that any reduction accepted unilaterally facilitates the conclusion of agreements which would consolidate the results obtained and widen their scope. An agreement of the kind suggested in the Soviet memorandum (ENDC/123), entailing the reduction of military expenditure by 10 to 15 per cent, appears to us to be promising. We have here a specific proposal which our Committee should study carefully.

The favourable political atmosphere to which the adoption of such a measure would give rise would certainly be accompanied by beneficial economic effects. In this connexion I should like to quote the following passage from the working paper submitted to the Committee by Mr. de Castro, representative of Brazil:

"... the resources at present allotted to military purposes might be progressively channelled towards peaceful ends, thus greatly benefiting all countries by virtue of an improvement in the economic and social standards of their peoples," (ENDC/126, p.1)

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

I should like to stress that the problem of the utilization of the economic resources released by the reduction of military expenditures is a matter of reoccupation to our Government also. I would remind you that the Government of the Romanian People's Republic has proposed for discussion at the forthcoming Conference on Trade and Development the importance, from the point of view of international trade and economic development, of the utilization for peaceful ends of the resources released by disarmament.

The Romanian delegation also regards as a matter of particular urgency the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. As the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Thomas, has pointed out, this would be a logical corollary to the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/PV.157, p.24).

In this connexion there seems to be general agreement in our Committee on the principle of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and the Committee seems to be unanimous in recognizing the danger to mankind of the prospect of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Government's memorandum lays stress on the following point:

"As the stocks of nuclear weapons increase, and the methods of manufacturing them are improved, and as ever new types of such weapons are being devised, the question of preventing their further dissemination becomes increasingly important." (ENDC/123, p.4)

The United States representative, Mr. Foster, expressed the same line of thought when he said that:

"Every increase in the number of nations controlling nuclear weapons will multiply the possibilities of nuclear confrontations and the risks of accidental or intentional use of nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.164, p.5)

But we find that recognition by our Western partners of the importance of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is accompanied by a diametrically-opposite policy which, in our opinion, is incompatible with the very idea of non-dissemination. That policy is embodied in the well-known Western plan for the establishment of the so-called multilateral nuclear forces of NATO.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

During our debates the United States representative tried to maintain that --
"The creation of such forces would be fully consistent with the
Irish resolution (1665 (XVI)) and would, in fact, reinforce
common policies to prevent wider dissemination of national
nuclear weapon capabilities." (ibid., p.8)

In this connexion I should like to quote resolution 1665 (XVI), which provides in
its operative part that nuclear States should undertake --

"... to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons
and from transmitting the information necessary for their
manufacture to States not possessing such weapons,"
and that the latter States should undertake --

"... not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such
weapons," (A/RES/1665 (XVI))

I should like in particular to emphasize the term "or otherwise" which appears
in the Irish resolution and, in my delegation's opinion, is a clear indication that
no State should be directly or indirectly offered access to nuclear weapons. But
the very prefix "multi-" implies multiplication, or more than there is at present,
and therefore a greater danger, as the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington,
pointed out so convincingly just now. The idea of non-dissemination is to limit the
number of nuclear Powers, not to increase it. The plan to establish multilateral
nuclear forces implies, on the contrary, that States having access to nuclear
weapons will become more numerous.

An agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and the simultaneous
existence of NATO multilateral nuclear forces would be like a spring frost which
produces thin layers of ice on which at every step we are in danger of slipping and
falling. No prudent person would venture out on such ice.

Moreover, the plan to establish NATO multilateral nuclear forces would endanger
the very region which is most sensitive from the point of view of the maintenance of
peace, namely, Central Europe. What would be the result of the emergence of even an
indirect possibility that, through the agency of the multilateral nuclear forces, the
Federal Republic of Germany might obtain access to nuclear weapons, with all the
serious consequences which that entails and which have been discussed at length in
our Committee? In our opinion it could hardly bring us nearer our goal of general
and complete disarmament; it would push us in the opposite direction, in the very
direction we ought not to follow.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

In this connexion I should like to remind you of the declaration submitted to this Conference by the Government of the German Democratic Republic (ENDC/124). Like the other socialist delegations, we regard as particularly opportune the proposal contained in this document: that the two German States should renounce nuclear weapons for ever'. The adoption of that proposal would make an important contribution to the relaxation of tension and to the consolidation of peace in Europe and throughout the world; at the same time it would promote the conclusion of an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons. This would be in the best interests of all peoples, including the German people.

Closely bound up with the problem of non-dissemination is that of the creation of denuclearized zones, which is one of the collateral measures provided for in the Soviet memorandum. The attention of Governments and of world public opinion is now focussed on this problem, which has assumed prominence on the international scene because it corresponds to the aspirations of the peoples towards peace and international security.

Nuclear attacks from and against such zones would be prohibited; and the possession, stockpiling, production, acquisition, transport, use and testing of nuclear weapons in such zones would be prohibited. They would thus be, as it were, precursors of a world freed from the nuclear danger.

The creation of denuclearized zones would meet the desire of the peoples all over the world to restrict the nuclear danger. The establishment of such zones would be universally regarded as a step towards the final and complete elimination of that danger. The creation of denuclearized zones would be a factor of peace and security, a beneficial link in the chain of measures aimed at eliminating the nuclear danger.

My delegation has already had an opportunity of stating its position with regard to this question (ENDC/PV.159, p.8). Nevertheless, we think it would not come amiss to remind you that as long ago as 10 September 1957 the Romanian Government advanced proposals, which were reiterated on 6 June 1959, for transforming the Balkans into a zone of peace and co-operation free from atomic weapons and missile bases, a zone of peaceful labour for the well-being of the peoples of that region and in the interests of universal peace. These proposals, which, as you know, met with the approval of several Balkan Governments, are now as timely as ever.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

So far as the great Powers are concerned, hitherto only the Soviet Union has offered guarantees to respect the Balkan region as a denuclearized zone. Expressing its appreciation of the efforts of countries favouring the adoption of measures for strengthening peace in the Balkans, the Government of the Soviet Union stated in its declaration of 25 June 1959:

"In this connexion, attention should be drawn to the Romanian Government's declaration of 6 June 1959, in which it is once more proposed that a conference of the Heads of Government of the countries of the Balkan peninsula should be convened in order to examine outstanding problems of concern to the countries of that region, including the proposal to establish in the Balkans a peaceful zone from which atomic weapons and missiles would be banned."

Wishing to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security and the establishment of a framework for the drafting of a regional agreement on the widest possible basis, the Romanian Government submitted for inclusion in the agenda of the fifteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations an item entitled "Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among European States having different social and political systems". This item was again placed unanimously on the agenda of the eighteenth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

In the explanatory memorandum (A/4440) circulated when this item was placed on the agenda, the Romanian delegation expressed its conviction that any improvement in relations among States at the regional level would contribute to the improvement of international relations as a whole and to the creation of a favourable atmosphere for world peace, international security and the settlement of important issues as yet unsolved.

The many proposals that have recently been advanced show the extent to which the idea of establishing denuclearized zones through comprehensive regional agreements corresponds to the universal desire for peace and security. Proposals exist in particular for establishing denuclearized zones in Central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1), Northern Europe (DC/201/Add.2), the Mediterranean area (ENDC/91), and other continents. We would also point out that the first stages of the establishment of denuclearized zones in Africa and in Latin America have already been accomplished.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The proposals before us relating to collateral measures show once again how many and various are the real possibilities of approaching the problem of disarmament and of advancing along the path of peace which is opened by disarmament. As I said just now, the Romanian delegation would have liked us to have an agenda on collateral measures drawn up by common agreement. Of course, agreement on the order of priority of the problems at issue would not signify agreement on the substance of any measure we decided to consider; but if we could succeed in agreeing on that order, a favourable climate would be created for agreeing on the substance of the problems we discussed.

The Romanian delegation expresses the hope that, through the efforts of the two co-Chairmen and through our own concerted endeavours, a positive solution will be found for this problem.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In the course of the Committee's work the majority of its members have expressed themselves in favour of settling the question of reducing military budgets. The representatives of the socialist countries -- Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania --- have spoken about the necessity of coming to a decision on the reduction of military budgets. We also note that in the statements of the representatives of India, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sweden, Brazil and Burma, the great importance of reducing military budgets was likewise stressed and the necessity of solving this problem pointed out. At our meeting of 13 February the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, stated that a measure such as the reduction of military budgets was of decisive importance in the question of disarmament and might determine to a large extent the success or the failure of our work (ENDC/PV.166, pp. 5 et seq.). Today the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, has also put forward with particular force and conviction the proposal that agreement be reached to reduce military budgets (supra, p. 8). In fact, at the present time there is no other proposal awaiting consideration by the Committee which would enjoy such wide support by the members of the Committee as the proposal to reduce military budgets.

(Mr. Tsarokin, USSR)

A substantial reduction of military budgets would have far-reaching positive consequences, both political and economic. On the one hand it would give the peoples greater security; and on the other hand it would open up much wider prospects for the economic development of States. It may be said without exaggeration that all the peoples of the world would gain if we reached agreement on a substantial reduction of military budgets.

The Soviet Union has already taken the path of reducing its military expenditures, and we are prepared to follow this path still further if, of course, the Western Powers likewise take the same path. Unfortunately the Western Powers -- allies of the United States in NATO -- are expanding the armaments race and increasing their military budgets. But as the call sounds, so the echo responds. Certainly we cannot fail to draw our own conclusions from this behaviour of the Western Powers; we must be cautious and vigilant.

It is quite obvious that a struggle is now going on in the West between two trends -- one in favour of adopting a number of measures in the direction of disarmament, and the other in favour of expanding the armaments race. We can regard as a manifestation of the first trend the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments, (ENDC/100/Rev.1) the agreement to refrain from placing in orbit any objects carrying nuclear weapons (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117 and the reduction of military budgets in the Soviet Union and the United States. We see a manifestation of the other trend in the recent decision of the United Kingdom Government to increase its military budget, and also in the growth of militaristic efforts in Western Germany.

We realize, however, that at present there still continues to exist in the world a favourable situation -- or rather, a more favourable situation than in the past -- which should enable us to arrive at a solution of the problem of disarmament. We therefore appeal to the members of the Committee to take advantage of this situation and to make joint efforts to solve the problem of reducing military budgets, which is of great importance for the solution of all other disarmament problems.

We could now, without any delay, make a substantial contribution to the further improvement of the international situation. Everyone agrees that a reduction of military budgets based on the policy of "mutual example" is a positive factor in international life. In present conditions, when a struggle is going on between two

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

trends, one in favour of disarmament and the other in favour of continuing the armaments race, it is most important that the example of the Soviet Union and the United States in this field should be followed by other States; this would widen the front of the struggle for disarmament, and would bring other countries into the sphere of practical measures.

It would be a good thing if our Committee were to address, in one form or another, to all States, or at least to those which possess considerable military power, an appeal to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States and some other countries which by way of "mutual example" have taken steps to reduce their military appropriations. The appeal could be based on the two corresponding paragraphs of the working paper submitted by the Brazilian delegation on 12 February 1964 (ENDC/126). Such an appeal would undoubtedly have a favourable influence on the policies of many States and would encourage them to carry out similar measures. This would contribute towards a further and substantial reduction of armaments by all States based on the policy of "mutual example"; and this in its turn would increase the possibilities of expanding economic assistance to developing countries.

The Committee should concentrate its attention on this problem. At the same time it would be most desirable to carry out a detailed discussion of the proposal to conclude an international agreement on the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/123). Such a discussion would make it possible to elucidate every aspect of this important question. We know that some will doubt the practicability of this proposal on the ground, for instance, that the United States Government has only just submitted to Congress a certain reduction of its military budget, and that it has thus exhausted all its possibilities in this regard for the current or forthcoming financial year. But that argument cannot be accepted as convincing.

We are deeply convinced that no State has, or can have, any serious reasons for not reducing its military budget at the present time. If governments agree among themselves to reduce military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent, it should not be difficult to obtain in their respective parliaments approval of such an agreement, which is so sound from the economic standpoint, and to carry out a new redistribution of the budgetary appropriations approved by parliaments. This would undoubtedly be welcomed by the peoples of all countries and greeted by them with great joy.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

The Governments which entered into such an agreement would undoubtedly win popularity among their own peoples. At the worst, nobody prevents them from looking a little ahead and relating this reduction of military expenditures to the next financial year, if it is impossible to relate it to the current financial year. Your Governments -- I refer to the Governments of the Western Powers -- can plan increases in their military expenditures right up to 1970; why then can they not provide for the reduction of these a year in advance? Of course they can.

Therefore we appeal to members of the Committee to discuss two concrete questions: first, the question of an appeal by the Committee to other States to follow the example of the Soviet Union and the United States and to take the path of reducing military expenditures; and, second, the question of preparing a draft international agreement on the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent.

In his message of 21 January to our Committee, President Johnson of the United States wrote:

"Today your search begins anew in a climate of hope. Last year's genuine gains have given us new momentum. Recent Soviet and American announcements of reductions on military spending, even though modest, have brightened the atmosphere further. Let us pray that the tide has turned -- that further and more far-reaching agreements lie ahead -- and that future generations will mark 1964 as the year the world turned for all time away from the horrors of war and constructed new bulwarks of peace." (ENDC/120)

We, of course, welcomed those words of President Johnson and should very much like to hope that they will be backed by deeds, so that in 1964, as the United States President said in the message I have just quoted, we may achieve "further and more far-reaching agreements". We hope our two proposals may be a modest start along that road.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): First let me welcome you, Mr. Chairman to this Conference. We are very happy to see you here once more.

I listened with great interest to the statement this morning by the representative of Burma, and we shall give it thorough study. I was particularly interested in his comment on President Johnson's "freeze" proposal (ENDC/120). The Soviet representative also commented on that proposal in his discussion of the reduction of military budgets.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

The freeze itself would produce a significant reduction in military budgets -- in that of the United States and also in that of the Soviet Union. The amount of any percentage reduction, whether by 10 or 15 per cent or any other proportion, would necessarily vary from country to country and would depend on the conditions and the present military budget of any particular country. However, acceptance here of such a freeze would mark a major step forward not only in reducing military budgets but also in stopping the arms race.

Our Soviet colleague has just discussed the possible adoption here of an agreement calling upon all States to reduce their military budgets. I stated the other day -- and I am glad to state again -- that we should welcome it if any nation were able to reduce its military expenditures and to apply any such savings to the benefit of mankind. The United States has sought for many years to find a way to stop the arms race. The United States has sent billions of dollars of aid to developing countries. We have consistently supported measures in the United Nations which deal with the application of disarmament savings to economic and social development. But concrete, verified disarmament agreements -- not vague, unenforceable resolutions -- are the best means of saving more funds for the betterment of mankind.

As I said earlier, President Johnson's proposal for a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear vehicles would permit a significant reduction of military budgets. Reductions of military budgets are the consequence, not the cause, of reduction in tensions. They can be the hoped-for result of the agreements which we are attempting to reach here; but we cannot expect the signing of a resolution or an agreement here, such as might be discussed in terms of the suggestion of our Soviet colleague, to make tensions go away. Let us keep firmly in mind the benefits which will accrue to mankind through the savings which actual disarmament will make possible. However, for real progress, let us promptly concentrate on meaningful measures which will deal with the basic problem of disarmament: the weapons themselves. We have put forward several proposals which we believe will best contribute to those ends. I hope we can consider them; I hope we can progress on them.

Mr. de CASTRO (Brazil) (translation from French): I should like at this stage of our discussion to express briefly the satisfaction felt by my delegation, as the initiator of the proposal to examine the problem of military budgets (ENEC/126), that all the members of this Committee, to whichever groups they belong, who have spoken on this question, have recognized that this collateral measure is really important and deserves detailed examination.

When we proposed that measures aiming at the reduction of military budgets should be studied, we had a certain number of objectives in mind. First, it seemed to us that, in view of the difficulty of achieving general and complete disarmament --- our ultimate goal --- by what we might term a direct route, it might be achieved by an indirect one, that of a progressive and continuous reduction of military budgets. That is why we suggested this slightly devious route in the hope that it might perhaps lead us more easily to an agreement. We realize that it is not easy to agree straightaway on a problem which is so controversial, so complicated, so complex and having so many political implications of all kinds, as the problem of general and complete disarmament. To my mind, this problem should be considered as a whole, but settled piecemeal. That is why we attach such great importance to collateral measures; because in our opinion, if we add one collateral measure to another we shall eventually --- and I hope this will happen as soon as possible in spite of the difficulties that face us --- reach our main objective, which is general and complete disarmament.

Another of our objectives concerns our method of work. We think that, if we are to make any progress along this path beset by difficulties and obstacles of every kind, we must concentrate our attention on definite objectives. If we try to progress in too roundabout a manner, as we unfortunately seem to be doing here, we may have the illusion that we are advancing whereas, on the contrary, we are moving backwards. That is why we thought that, if we concentrated on one subject, considered it thoroughly and envisaged not only its difficulties and obstacles, but also its possibilities, perhaps we might find ourselves in a position to make rather faster progress.

I must say that my delegation is among those which think that our progress is too slow. We may believe that world public opinion, which possibly is not fully aware of the obstacles and difficulties that our task presents, is perhaps unduly impatient. Nevertheless, it is impatient and thinks we are progressing

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

too slowly -- not too slowly, in my opinion, in the view of the difficulties we are encountering, but too slowly for the objective we are pursuing. As I said on a previous occasion in this Committee, while the solutions we are envisaging are of a long-term character, the danger that threatens us is a short-term one, visible to us all. That is why we must try to progress a little faster.

The Committee has had some difficulty in focussing its attention on one subject, and that is why we made our proposal. May I, therefore, be allowed to congratulate myself on choosing the problem of military budgets, to which our meeting today has been exclusively devoted? We think that is an achievement, for today we have been able to adopt a new method of work. I hope that this example will prove profitable, and that at a later meeting we shall be able to examine another collateral measure in detail and see what progress can be made.

I should like to reaffirm my hope that the problem of military budgets will remain on our agenda, and that we shall be able to prove to all that in this new world, where a new political conscience has been born with the advent of the atomic era, we are endeavouring to find a solution to the problem and that the Conference desires, not to prevent disarmament, but to bring it about. Some have compared our Conference to a fixation abscess, and say that while we talk we continue to arm. But, at a time when world armaments are growing, there could be no clearer demonstration of our good faith than to reduce military budgets and withhold the resources required for accelerating the armaments race.

I therefore thank you once more, Mr. Chairman and all the members of this Committee who displayed their interest (ENDC/PV.166) at the meeting at which we submitted our working paper (ENDC/126), and also at today's meeting; for even if the general outlines of this working paper are not followed, its central idea, that of the study of this problem, has been accepted.

When it is urged that reductions in military budgets must be progressive we are fully in agreement, for clearly such reductions will be necessary in order to create the fund proposed by my delegation. That is the first stage.

I hope that if an agreement is achieved on this first stage there will be no difficulty in reaching the second. As all the members of this Committee, and particularly the representatives of the two great Powers -- the Soviet Union and the United States -- have mentioned, the Governments of these two great countries

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

have manifested their intention, not only to reduce their military budgets, but also to devote the savings thus achieved to peaceful ends. In my opinion there can be no more peaceful end than the re-establishment of the economic balance in a world menaced economically and ideologically by deep antagonisms.

I believe that every effort should be made to improve human conditions; for we know that such scourges as hunger, poverty and sickness are sources of social tension and threaten the world. If we realize this situation the day will come, I hope, when, the problem of reducing military budgets having been solved, we shall be able to make reasonable use of the resources thus released. It is then that we shall have completely reached our objective, which is to avoid a catastrophe.

But it is evident that at least a latent catastrophe exists. We believe that an atom bomb kills not only after the declaration of war; it kills at all its stages. First, it kills at the moment when it is designed, for the atmospheric tests carried out before it can be made have already begun to kill by provoking cases of cancer, leukaemia, genetic degeneration and the like. That is one way of killing. Secondly, the atom bomb kills during its manufacture, for we know that this costs thousands of millions of dollars. We know that from \$120,000 million to \$140,000 million are being spent today on the manufacture of the bomb, while the total incomes of all the under-developed countries in the world --- and there are over one hundred of these --- do not exceed \$180,000 million. Thus we are devoting to the destruction of the human race the fruits of the labours of two-thirds of mankind. In this third world, in these two-thirds of all mankind, there are millions upon millions of human beings who are dying of avoidable hunger, sickness and poverty. They are dying because they are under-developed, and they are under-developed because we are living in an unbalanced world, a world which is unbalanced mainly because of the armaments race. Consequently these human beings are the victims of stealthy and silent attacks by atomic bombs which have not yet been exploded. That is why I say that the atom bomb kills at this stage also.

At the third stage of this atomic match there will be no spectators, for they will all have been annihilated. But I hope we shall never reach that third stage, and I shall refrain from commenting on it. I only mention it in order to stress that we must make every effort to avoid the two preceding stages: the design and manufacture of the atom bomb, which, while changing the military tactics of the world, also changes its political consciousness.

(Mr. de Castro, Brazil)

Because my country is conscious of this truth, it wishes to participate, modestly but vigorously, in securing results which can, we believe, be speedily achieved in military budget reduction.

The CHAIRMAN (United Arab Republic): I should like to thank my colleagues here who were kind enough to welcome me. May I also take this opportunity to associate myself with the welcome given to our new colleagues at this Conference?

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 168th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Abdel Fattah Hassan, representative of the United Arab Republic.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Burma, Romania, the Soviet Union, the United States and Brazil.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 25 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon.

